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This article seeks to explain the conditions for the emergence and 
institutionalization of the cultural paradiplomacy of the city of Barcelona and its local 
effects. The recognition of the city as an active participant on the international stage is 
based on its evolution from an industrial to a service economy. Against this backdrop, 
Barcelona’s city council, in common with many other city authorities operating in the 
world’s metropolises during the 1980s, initiated its own cultural paradiplomacy as a 
strategy for attracting capital and promoting local development. This policy became 
established as part of a new multi-level system of governance. This article analyses the 
causes of the institutionalization of this activity from an intergovernmental perspective. 
It concludes that in the context of economic globalization, the emergence of cities’ 
cultural paradiplomacy is strongly related to the restructuring of the State and its 
external administration and to the intensification of the “cultural branding” of cities as a 
tool for global competition.   
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The foreign policies of city administrations today are an important element in the 
internationalization of both nations (Brenner 2004) and regions (Keating 2005). At the 
same time, the decentralization processes initiated by many countries have fostered the 
proliferation of relations between sub-state governments and an array of actors and 
organizations at the supra- and sub-national levels (Castells 2009, Duchacek et al. 1998, 
Preteceille  1994, Sassen  2007). As part of this reconfiguration that began during the 
1980s, cities have steadily increased their level of intervention in the international arena 
and in the establishment of global networks (Castells 1993, Harrison 1995). However, 
the development of cities’ foreign cultural policy represents a challenge to the 
traditional understanding of diplomacy1 and, as such, for the political construction of a 
coordinated and persuasive representation of the nation-state.  
Foreign policy today is characterized by what has been described as 
“multilayered diplomacy” (Hocking 1993, p.3). This implies the participation of actors 
at sub-national levels in international relations, in what Duchacek (1990) has called 
parallel or “paradiplomacy”. However, the nature of this participation differs depending 
on the sub-national level involved. The paradiplomatic activity of regional governments 
has been explained in terms of such variables as nationalism, the decreasing power of 
the State in matters of market regulation (Lecours and Moreno 2003) and new forms of 
social participation (Bélanger 1994). But the causes and characteristics of the cultural 
paradiplomacy of cities, barely studied to date, appear to differ.  
This article therefore aims to contribute to the analysis of these local 
international policies. In seeking to shed further light on them, we study the case of the 
cultural paradiplomacy of the city of Barcelona and its relations with the external 
cultural action of both the central State and the (regional) Catalan government (the 
Generalitat). The Barcelona case is particularly significant in this respect owing to the 
importance attached to international elements in the city’s cultural policy and the 
contentious implementation of various contradictory projects in the development of that 
policy. Here, we provide an interpretation of the institutionalization of cultural 
paradiplomacy in Barcelona from a historical and multi-level perspective by conducting 
an analysis that reveals the elements responsible for the establishment of this policy. 
Additionally, the analysis helps to clarify the dynamics to which this policy has given 
rise in the local political domain. Finally, it also contributes to identifying what 
underpins clashes between the city’s image as projected in the international arena and 
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city images that emerge at the local level from different urban social processes. 
Ultimately, our analysis should pave the way for future comparative studies in this field. 
Since the 1980s, various local processes, including the boom in tourism and 
increasing social gentrification, have called into question the methods and goals of 
paradiplomacy, bringing them into direct confrontation with other internationalization 
strategies, such as cultural branding and policies for promoting tourism. These two 
ways of conceptualizing and projecting the culture of Barcelona have had a marked 
impact on the definition of the city’s singular character. As such, Barcelona’s heritage 
has typically been interpreted in two contrasting ways: one traditional (or nationalistic), 
the other cosmopolitan. These two identities have been defended by agents with an 
array of ever-changing goals. In this article, we show how control over the international 
image and the local heritage of Barcelona, currently transformed in an important 
symbolic capital, has been a constant point of contention. This has come about as a 
result of their capacity to generate political and economic benefits through branding 
processes, as symbols of national identities, as well as their being instrumental in 
upholding partisan interests. 
 
 
Cultural diplomacy, branding and the intensification of paradiplomacies 
Public diplomacy, or “public opinion diplomacy” as it was known during the postwar, is 
the practice by which relations are established between governments, people and civil 
organizations abroad (Mannheim 1994). For Cull it is “an international actor’s attempt 
to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public.” 
(2009, p. 12), while, today, as Zaharna (2009, p.86) points out, approaches to public 
diplomacy might range from propaganda to nation branding, to cultural programs. In 
this regard, cultural diplomacy has generally been defined as a subgroup of public 
diplomacy.  
Cultural diplomacy has gained renewed prominence in recent decades in the wake 
of economic and social transformations in the cultural sphere. This somewhat fuzzy 
policy, designed by governments and implemented by diplomats, targets foreign 
audiences as well as other governments (Bound et al. 2007, p.21, Garcha 2007). It was 
shaped at the end of the 19th century, with the creation of such institutions as the 
Alliance Française (1883) and the first postcolonial attempts of European liberal elites 
to expand their influence through symbolic capital, above all via languages (Paschalidis 
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2009). Initially, cultural diplomacy  consisted solely of mechanisms of cultural 
exchange (such as those found in international networks, the dissemination of the arts 
and study trips), but it also rapidly became one of the tools of war propaganda (Arndt 
2007). Today, the various definitions of cultural diplomacy all have in common the 
concept of the artistic and intellectual exchange between nations; yet, they all differ in 
their understanding  of what culture is and in the goals they seek to fulfill (Arndt 2008, 
p. 31, Bélanger 1994, p. 422, Cummings 2003, p. 1).  
Since the middle of the 20th century, the actors involved in cultural international 
relations have diversified markedly. Against the backdrop of the emergence of 
multilevel governance, the interrelations of transnational organizations at a range of 
different levels from the supra-national to the local level have served to emphasize the 
multifaceted character of these policies. Such sub-state external policies or 
paradiplomacies (Criekemans 2006) have been the subject of growing research interest, 
primarily in pluri-national States such as Belgium, Canada and the UK, and at both the 
regional (Massart-Piérard 1999, Lecours 2002, Paquin 2004) and city levels (Milani 
2010, Nunes 2005). However, to date few studies have been made of cities’ cultural 
paradiplomacy and there have been few attempts to examine the relations between this 
kind of paradiplomacy and other cultural policies at the local level. All in all, this 
represents a great deficit, since local cultural policies have acquired considerable 
importance in recent decades (Bianchini 1993, Menger 2010) while, at the same time, 
their international component has gained in prominence (Negrier 1997). 
Any examination of local cultural policy needs to distinguish between cultural 
paradiplomacy and the one-way flow communication strategy of branding. These two 
practices are often confused, both in terms of their theoretical and practical 
characteristics, because one of the bases for creating a territorial brand (besides tourism, 
exports or governance) is the culture of a place (Anholt 2006). But while cultural 
paradiplomacy acts as an instrument to project heritage and diversity by adopting a 
relational approach, branding is applied to different political territories so as to promote 
a particular, and usually, homogeneous image, with the aim of reaping economic 
benefits. City branding has been practiced since the nineties as part of the so-called 
‘entrepreneurial turn’ in local policy (Harvey 1989, Kotler et al. 1993). And while it is 
sometimes considered a public channel for disseminating information as a common 
good (Leonard 2002), city branding is increasingly being designed by consultant offices 
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and private companies (Aronczyk 2008). Thus, in practice, it is characterized by a 
somewhat limited social participation. 
Here, therefore, we adopt an approach that clearly differentiates between branding 




Contextualization of cultural paradiplomacy in Barcelona 
Spain’s transition to democracy was characterized by a process of decentralization of its 
legal and administrative systems, resulting in a quasi-federal scheme of government 
known as the “State of Autonomies” (Aja 2007). This was established in 1978 along 
with the National Constitution and the subsequent enactment of the Statutes of 
Autonomy, which created seventeen Autonomous Communities and two autonomous 
cities as Spain’s first-level political division. Three of these communities, Catalonia, the 
Basque Country and Galicia, were given the status of “historic nationalities” (Art. 2) 
and established their own co-official languages. Nationalist movements in these regions 
first emerged in the 19th century, but over the course of the following century they were 
repressed by the centralist, mono-cultural dictatorship that ruled the country between 
1939 and 1975. 
Following the transition and the establishment of the State of Autonomies, which 
recognized the country’s cultural and political diversity, greater demands for autonomy 
were made. The organization of the State system came to be characterized by the 
multiple tensions between the different nations making up the State and the central 
government. Indeed, the country’s plurinational and plurilingual character gave shape to 
the decentralization of State cultural policy (Rubio 2008) and, among other far-reaching 
transformations, favored the delegation of most aspects of cultural management 
(including museums, libraries and the performing arts) to these governments in the 
autonomies. In Catalonia, where previously many cultural projects had been blocked by 
the repressive dictatorship of General Franco (Bonet 2001), the path was now clear to 
develop a cultural policy oriented towards the promotion of Catalan identity (Villarroya 
Planas 2011).  
While according to the National Constitution international relations are the 
exclusive competence of the central State (Art. 149), the various legal reconfigurations 
and the delegation of competences to the Autonomous Communities that formed part of 
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the decentralization process opened the door to sub-state foreign policies. This 
paradiplomacy was further enhanced by Spain’s accession to the European Union in 
1986. Most notably, Catalonia has been able to promote its cultural paradiplomacy by 
building an institutional structure that today has significant reach for a sub-state 
framework.2 This process has been expanded since the 1990s in the context of a broad 
consensus across the political spectrum with regard to its importance for regional 
progress. Moreover, during certain political periods, these tools have been seen to be 
critical for obtaining international recognition of the distinctiveness of Catalonia in the 
face of Spanish foreign policy and identity,3 reflected in a lack of systemic organization 
and representational differentiation and the absence of any programmed coordination 
between the external cultural actions of the Catalan and Central governments.  
At the same time, the Barcelona City Council4 has also built up a government 
structure to promote its own cultural paradiplomacy and it has formulated a specific 
program to stimulate transnational relations and to create networks via its cultural 
activities. This policy constitutes very much part of the city’s internationalization 
process. Barcelona’s increasing projection has resulted in a patent “transcending” of 
negotiations between Catalonia and Spain as it has shown great aptitude for promoting 
its own culture worldwide, becoming in the process one of the most visited cities in 
Europe.5 On the other hand, its status as “capital” constituted part of an extended 
dispute between the city’s socialist administration (1979-2011) and CIU, a nationalist 
right-wing coalition that headed the Generalitat (Catalan government) between 1980 
and 2003 (Bouzada 2007, Bonet 2001, Gabancho 2009, Marzo and Badia 2006, p. 17). 
This was due largely to discrepancies regarding the role the city should play in 
representation of Catalonia and the function it should fulfill in a nationalist political 
project. In this regard, we shall show how the cultural projection of Barcelona , 
represented a challenge with respect to its political capitalization and associated social 




The establishment of Barcelona’s cultural paradiplomacy: from the Olympic 
Games to the creation of ICUB  
The consolidation of the city of Barcelona as a global icon has been based on a far-
reaching public intervention in the cultural field and on a process of urban regeneration, 
7 
 
which also involved a major social overhaul. This process was initiated in 1979 by the 
Socialist Party of Catalonia6 (PSC) (Subirats and Brugue 1997) under the leadership of 
the city’s former Mayor, Pasqual Maragall (1982-1997), who left a strong personal 
mark on the city’s infrastructure and cultural panorama. Maragall developed a civic 
discourse that manifested specific representations of Barcelona’s personality. According 
to McNeill (2001), in reference to a concept forwarded by Benedict Anderson, his 
discourse allowed the society of Barcelona to be considered as an “imagined 
community”. It was an “identity generation” rooted in ideological precepts – a sort of 
“cosmopolitan left-wing nationalism”, that gave “coherence to change” (McNeill 2001, 
p. 4). Local culture and common heritage were the key elements that contributed to this 
metamorphosis and to the revitalization of the historical singularity and avant-garde 
character of the city (Mascarell, 2007). 
 The urban reforms had been initiated earlier by socialist mayor Narcís Serra 
(1979-1982) and his so-called policy of ‘darning’ urbanism (Maragall 1992). They were 
continued with a campaign aimed at revamping the city’s private heritage under the 
slogan Barcelona posa’t guapa! (Barcelona, make yourself beautiful!), which was 
launched in 1985 and comprised a system of public funding for the private sector aimed 
at rehabilitating and improving the aesthetics of the city’s residential heritage. The 
process went hand in hand with arrangements for the 1992 Olympic Games, set in 
motion some six years prior to the event itself. The Games, organized in partnership 
with the private sector7, were supported by all three tiers of government: the local, the 
regional and the central levels. The preparations for the ’92 Olympics served to boost 
the institutionalization of official paradiplomacy in Barcelona, with the creation of the 
City Council’s International Relations Department. Margarita Obiols, former Director 
of the Department, has said in this respect:  
 
“This was initiated in 1986 with the nomination of Barcelona as an 
Olympic city. In 1987, following the elections, it was decided to create 
an international relations team and three regional priorities were 
established: Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean. At the same 
time we sought to maintain an active presence in international 




As part of this process, the city council adopted an extensive agenda dedicated to 
public paradiplomacy and making the city internationally visible (Garcia, 2002). To this 
end, specific structures of cultural paradiplomacy were created. Before and after the 
games, it was decided to promote what became known as the Cultural Olympiad. To 
this end, in 1998 the city council created the firm, Olímpiada Cultural SA (OCSA), a 
public-private partnership that operated separately from the city’s Olympic 
organization. It was headed by the city mayor and managed by various public and 
private sector agents. OCSA organized a program of cultural events entitled the “Year 
of Sport” (1989), the “Year of the Arts” (1990), the “Year of the Future” (1991) and, 
finally, in 1992 the “Olympic Festival of the Arts” (Moragas i Spà 2008). However, the 
organization’s operations were characterized by constant disputes with the various tiers 
of government. Thus, owing to political discrepancies, the agreement between the city 
council and the Catalan Department of Culture to promote the above program of 
cultural years was not signed until 1991. Interestingly, the Games’ opening and closing 
ceremonies included symbolic elements of Catalonia and, to a lesser extent, integrated 
certain symbols of Spain (Moragas i Spà 2012, 2008).  
 After the Olympic Games, Pasqual Maragall wrote (1992, p. 7) in reference to the 
potential achievements of the city: “International interests, tourism and business 
investment, will be, without doubt, other positive factors in Barcelona 1993.” Indeed, 
Maragall’s international and pro-European vocation was subsequently reflected in his 
continuing political efforts to promote the city’s paradiplomacy.8 Thanks to these 
initiatives, his government demonstrated a great capacity to manage the dialectic of 
local and international policy. This entailed the deliberate use of international voices as 
amplifiers of local interests and of homegrown processes integrated within international 
networks and dynamics. It is these processes that we believe contributed to the 
consolidation of Barcelona as an international cultural center (Subirats and Brugue 
1997, p. 261, Subirós 1994).  
In the wake of the Games, the city council undertook an ideological and 
organizational reconsideration of its cultural policy. This also implied the 
autonomization and diversification of its public intervention in cultural actions abroad. 
While various actions continued to make up the programs directed by the City Council’s 
International Relations Department, new developments were made.9 In 1996, 
Barcelona’s Institute of Culture (ICUB) was created. This public agency, designed by 
Ferrán Mascarell, a historian and one of the ideologues of the Barcelona model, 
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integrated the city’s various cultural management offices. Today, ICUB promotes 
cultural policies by adopting an entrepreneurial approach and by managing the city’s 
multiple facilities and its cultural actors. Mascarell established the organization with a 
group of professionals who were also engaged in seeking to get Barcelona nominated as 
the European Capital of Culture 2001; a project that would later be abandoned. Thus, 
ICUB was founded with the idea of pursuing two goals: the revitalization and the 
internationalization of the city’s culture. The institution has made a great contribution to 
international cultural activity,10 the promotion of arts and art events in the territory, and 
it has actively participated in international cultural networks. Furthermore, in 1996 
ICUB set up the Barcelona Plató Film Commission, aimed at promoting the production 
of movie making in the city by offering financial support and other technical advice. 
 
 
Barcelona’s cultural paradiplomacy and city branding since 1999 
Although Maragall stood down in 1997, the PSC continued to govern Barcelona until 
2006. In 1999, Ferrán Mascarell, former director of ICUB, was appointed City 
Councilor for Culture and the city’s ‘Strategic Plan of Culture’ was presented that same 
year. This emerged after a period in which the city’s cultural policy was the subject of 
much rethinking on the part of the many actors operating in the cultural field, concerned 
by the low rates of participation of Barcelona’s citizens in the local offer (Obiols, 1998) 
and by the first signs of the undesired effects of internationalization. 
During the 1990s the city government had promoted a range of programs aimed 
at internationalizing the Barcelona image, in which foreign policy served as a tool for 
accomplishing specific political, urban and social goals. In contrast, the new decade was 
to be more closely associated with an economic turn in local cultural policy, 
characterized by the provision of more space of action in which private capital might 
operate and the promotion of the “city’s cultural thematization” (Casellas et al. 2010, 
Rodríguez Morató 2005). In this vein, the Barcelona Plató Film Commission has been 
identified as acting as an “instrument of propaganda” in the diffusion and naturalization 
of the aestheticization of the urban space and of a politically constructed image 
(Balibrea 2005). But while the local administration has been characterized by its 
concern for social participation (García 2008, Subirós 1999, p. 28), its policies have also 
been criticized for their excessive attention to tourism (Bonet 2001; Casellas et al. 2010) 
and for a range of diverse outcomes, including the adaptation of urban areas to 
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marketing strategies and to previously projected images, and increasing rates of 
gentrification and cultural homogenization ( Capel 2007, McNeill 2001, Nofre i Mateo 
2010, Palou 2009). In this emerging context, the city council seemed to have developed 
an approach to paradiplomacy that differed from that of satisfying social ‘needs’. As a 
Barcelona opinion leader has said: “not all internationalization implies the dignifying of 
culture. Many elements such as the appeal to kitsch, giving backing to formal 
grandiloquence and mannerism lead to tourism but not to cultural 
internationalization.”(Ramoneda 2011, p. 50). Incidentally, at this juncture, the 
importance of the Barcelona brand, exploited now by diverse sectors within the 
administration, including the tourism and finance departments, and the growing 
intervention of private actors, had a marked influence on Barcelona’s cultural policies.  
  In this sense, the paradiplomatic activity of the city council began to reveal the 
tensions between a public paradiplomacy focused on branding and the approach favored 
by the ICUB which, in the words of its policy adviser, Esteve Caramés (pers. comm., 19 
Sept. 2013), was oriented more towards the promotion of local art. Yet, ICUB’s cultural 
policy continued to show a concern for internationalization. Indeed, the 1999 Strategic 
Plan of Culture highlights this dual focus: on the one hand, the importance of culture as 
an element of development and social cohesion; and, on the other, as is pointed out in 
the Plan: “Barcelona can promote its role as cultural capital of Catalonia, as the cultural 
co-capital of the Spanish State and as one of the cultural capitals of Europe with the 
greatest opportunities of self-projection.” (ICUB 1999, p. 4). Moreover, the Plan 
endorses a policy of internationalization based on networks, trade fairs and meetings in 
order to create the conditions to attract creative minds and to diversify the cultural offer 
in coordination with the tourist sector. The main strategies of cultural 
internationalization continued to be the organization of major events, the promotion of 
the cultural industries and the taking of an active, pioneering role in city networks and 
supranational organizations (Castells and Ollé 2004, p. 13). Thus, for example, in 2002 
Barcelona organized the Eurocities Culture Forum11. At the same time, it has signed a 
large number of agreements with cities and bodies around the world to promote 
culture.12 
In a similar vein, Barcelona, in an effort at renewing the city’s Olympic spirit, 
undertook the organization in 2004 of a highly significant project promoted by the then 
President of Catalonia, Pasqual Maragall: the Universal Forum of Cultures. The Forum 
was a joint undertaking of the city council, the Generalitat (since 2003 both authorities 
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were controlled by the Socialist Party), Spain’s Central Government and UNESCO. The 
event integrated all the city’s main cultural amenities and counted on the active 
involvement of various social organizations. Its program was centered on three main 
issues: support for peace, sustainable development and cultural diversity. The objectives 
of the Forum were to promote social debate and to create a space in which the 
international dimension of these three issues might be debated and their problems 
addressed. This latter goal gave the Forum an “intrinsically international character” 
(Rodríguez Morató 2005, p.369). However, the project came in for fierce criticism 
owing to the concomitant urban speculation and the lack of social involvement (Acebal 
2008). Ferrán Mascarell was particularly skeptical about the event given its inability to 
involve the local community (Caramés, pers. comm., 19th Sept. 2013) and he would 
subsequently refer to it as a ‘failure’, because in its organization “culture lost out to 
short-term politics” (Serra 2008). As part of the reconsideration of the Barcelona model 
following the Forum, a new Strategic Plan of Culture was drawn up in 2006. The new 
Plan recognized the need for the city’s cultural policy to tackle the emerging effects of 
globalization in the urban environment, including immigration and cultural diversity. 
Moreover, it emphasized the importance of being competitive on these issues in relation 
to other cities (Barcelona 2006, p. 14). One of its proposals was to highlight various 
projects centered on Barcelona as a Cultural Capital, such as the rehabilitation of its 
cultural amenities and the need to host international events. 
The cultural paradiplomacy of the city of Barcelona today is a transversal 
activity so that a significant part of the ICUB’s structure (divided in seven divisions) is 
concerned with cultural internationalization. For example, the division for the 
Promotion of Cultural Sectors, which manages the Catalonia-Barcelona Film 
Commission, undertakes many actions of internationalization via its so-called Creation 
Factories (ICUB 2012, p. 20). The factories comprise various sites, located in post-
industrial buildings in different city neighborhoods, for the production of the visual arts, 
which attract creative minds from around the world and organize events via the 
international networks. One of the other divisions, that of Local Culture, organizes the 
traditional city fiesta of La Mercè celebrated in September, which today is an 
international event with artists performing from around the world in a range of activities 
that include dance, concerts, and the visual arts. In 2012, 1.4 million people participated 
in the fiesta (ICUB 2012). ICUB’s work in the city’s international projection and its 
cultural cooperation program, managed by the Barcelona Capital division, includes a 
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group of projects specifically aimed at promoting cultural internationalization. For 
example, the Grec Festival is an international point of reference in the fields of dance, 
circus, music and theatre. The international work of the ICUB is today complemented 
by its growing exploitation of its on-line resources used for example in promoting its 
Creation Factories (ICUB 2012, p. 20) and disseminating information about the Grec 
Festival via an interactive program called “Grec Innovates” (ICUB 2012, p 37). 
In 2012, ICUB employed around 424 civil servants and its general budget 
amounted to 117 million Euros (ICUB 2012). Given the transversal nature of cultural 
paradiplomacy, it is not easy to identify the specific amount of human and economic 
resources allocated to cultural internationalization. However, the international 
dimension is evident in many of the ICUB’s activities and one of its priorities is to 
“boost the international projection of the agents that form part of the city’s cultural 
system” (ICUB 2012, p. 38). 
 
Table 1.  Main activities in the cultural paradiplomacy of ICUB (2001-2010) 
  
 
In short, the city council’s foreign activity comprises a diverse range of artistic 
exchanges and cultural network projects that coexist with branding and major cultural 
events. These latter strategies seem to have promoted top-down policies, in which social 
organizations have made only a limited contribution.13 Nonetheless, there would seem 
to be a growing market presence along with the closer involvement of different actors 
from civil society in the development of the city’s cultural paradiplomacy. From a 
historical perspective, even the large-scale events have been characterized by a 
segmented social participation during their design, organization and aftermath. 
Moreover, the city’s cultural organizations have been actively involved in cultural and 
artistic activities abroad so that today multiple associations from Barcelona’s cultural 
tertiary sector participate in actions outside the country (Fina and Subirats 2011).  
 
 
The emergence of cities’ cultural paradiplomacy    
As discussed above, city governments have introduced new modes of external influence 
and, as a result, have modified their traditional role in this arena. The outcome is that 
cities’ cultural paradiplomacy has gradually gained in autonomy and its capacity to act. 
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Below we examine the macro variables that account for this development and discuss 
their relation to the case of the city of Barcelona.  The first factor is undoubtedly the 
position acquired by culture in contemporary societies, characterized by the growing 
significance attached to cultural goods, services and representations as essential 
elements of modern-day society and to their public management in a post-Fordist age. 
This phenomenon is closely linked to changes in the social organization of the arts and 
to the multiple changes in cultural production and consumption (Rodríguez Morató 
2012, 2007). In this new setting, culture has become a central element of political 
struggle and economic competition. The recovery of autonomous government and the 
major social transformation in Catalonia initiated with the transition towards democracy 
have been instrumental in shaping this cultural shift. As Flaquer and Giner (1992) have 
stressed: “In Catalan society, culture has gradually become a crucial entity of the 
collective consciousness, and one that has been intensely politicized. An entity that is 
most clearly polysemic and polyvalent.” This process has been inextricably associated 
with the particular significance afforded to culture, subject as it has been to a 
programmatic substantiation and restoration, and used as an instrument for the 
legitimization of divergent political projects (Giner 1996). Against this sociopolitical 
backdrop, the culture and image of Barcelona have become invaluable capital for public 
management. 
Second, state regulation and globalization have changed the structure of public 
authority (Jessop 1997). In turn, this change in political direction, characterized by the 
internalization of  “the trans-boundary function” (Sassen 2007) of the State, has resulted 
in various geopolitical transformations. It is a process that has seen a shift from 
government to systems of governance and the transfer of state power to sub- and supra-
national institutions (Jessop 1997, p. 32). In this post-Fordist framework, cities have 
become renewed political and economic actors. For example, as Evans (2003, p.12) 
describes, the regional organization promoted by the European Union since the eighties 
has favored the leadership of cities: “Politically, this has also empowered city 
authorities over central and even regional (‘meso’)tiers of government”. These changes 
served to promote competition between cities in their attempts to attract investment and 
to boost the participation of the private sector in issues of cultural policy. This is clearly 
reflected today in the proliferation of international urban art festivals and performances 
and the profusion of transnational organizations of cities and global networks. In this 
respect, the development undergone by Barcelona’s cultural paradiplomacy is especially 
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representative of the restructuring in the inter-scalar administration of culture over the 
last few decades.  
. Another feature of this transformation has been the convergence process entered 
into by cities with regard to their branding and cultural paradiplomacy. This is well 
illustrated by the cities of Paris and Berlin14. Many cities, using cultural management 
and similar strategies of branding, pursue internationalization as a means of boosting 
their competitiveness and attracting capital (Zukin 1995, Bianchini 1993). The 
institutionalization of these practices is an organizational facet of the so-called 
‘entrepreneurial city’, in which what were formerly national policies are now also being 
implemented “from below” (Jessop 1997, p. 35). In this regard, the “re-
territorialization” that nations have been seeking to achieve through national branding 
techniques (Aronczyk 2009) proves to be more easily achieved by city governments. 
Today’s city authorities enjoy many advantages over other political actors, including, 
for instance, the regions and provinces, and have access to the instruments that ensure 
they can fulfill the goals set in their external cultural policies. Cities today benefit from 
the concentration of different forms of capital and a great capacity for communication 
with a range of international sectors (Castells 1997). Moreover, they play host to a huge 
number of cultural agents and institutions (Rodríguez Morató 2005). Barcelona is a 
good example of this: witness, the way in which it has had the ability to create a 
“Bohemian brand”, as in the case of the Raval city district (Rius 2013), and to develop 
its brand by exploiting the “comparative advantage” of the city’s Modernisme 
architectural style (Balibrea 2007). In order to implement successful processes of 
heritagization and to offer a diversity of cultural goods and representations, the city is 
proving to be more attractive than the traditional idea presented by a homogenous image 
of national identity (Evans 2003, p. 7). 
The final factor is the transformation recorded in local cultural policy in the 
framework of this new conceptual model. In this regard, the development of cities’ 
cultural paradiplomacy can be seen as forming part of the local and entrepreneurial turn 
of cultural policy (Connolly 2011) and of its general redefinition (Cherbo and 
Wyszomirski 2000). Thus, we have witnessed a general tendency towards the 
diversification of the fields of cultural action and the incorporation of private actors and 
social organizations, with cultural policy being approached in systemic terms 
(Rodríguez Morató 2005, p. 370, Rius 2003, p. 4). As we have seen, attention to the 
“external view” is today an essential factor in the design of cultural policy (Aronczyk 
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2008, p. 44). The increasing organization of cultural paradiplomacy in a context of 
social legitimacy of internationalization policies affects the relation between local actors 
and, ultimately, it influences the forms of association between culture and policy. In this 
context, “scalar transformations in the territorial government” (Marshall 2004, p. 6) also 
promote the specialization of cultural paradiplomacy as a prized and shared instrument 
for diverse areas of urban governance. Likewise, it enabled various spheres of public 
administration to acquire expertise in aspects of external cultural policy, such as 
Diaspora policies and the creative economy. In this respect, there is a clear connection 
between foreign action and the adoption of local cultural policies and its agential 
conditions. Today, this orientation incorporates foreign activity as a significant area for 
cities’ “cultural policy systems”. 
 
 
Specific political conditions underpinning the development of Barcelona’s cultural 
paradiplomacy development: cultural paradiplomacy in a “stateless capital” 
 
Catalan cultural paradiplomacy and the State 
The organization of the contemporary system of governance implies a “reordering of the 
relationship between government and governance within the overall political system 
and (…) major trans-territorial and international governance mechanisms at regional 
and local level” (Jessop 1997, p. 33). In this regard, the politically managed reform of 
the state has paved the way for the increasing significance of cities in international 
relations and changes in the ways of government and competition at each State level. 
Hence, cities’ “intermestic” (Duchacek 1984) policies (i.e., international + domestic) 
need to be analyzed in terms of the relations established between State political, legal 
and economic structures (Brenner 2003, p. 3). This we undertake to do below. 
 The end of the dictatorship in 1975 ushered in a period of extensive decentralization 
in Spain’s external cultural activities. However, despite this, the system of cultural 
diplomacy has never been truly coordinated or systematized (Otero and Marco 2010, p. 
7; Noya 2003, p. 6; Alonso 2004, p. 23; Colino 2007, p. 20). In this context, two 
possible interpretations might be made of the paradiplomacies of the Autonomous 
Communities: as an attempt to develop a policy for a quasi-federal and multi-national 
system or as an activity that supposes a “deconstructive dynamic” for the State 
(Armiñan 2004, p. 22). In this regard, Spain’s Central government and the Generalitat, 
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despite some common cultural projects overseas, have worked as differentiated and 
non-coordinated channels.  
 Over the last few decades, various attempts have been made to recentralize Spain’s 
external policies or, alternatively, to provide a better balance in the competences of the 
Autonomous Communities. Indeed, following the resolution taken by the Constitutional 
Tribunal (2010) to limit proposed reforms to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy that 
would have increased Catalonia intervention abroad and various measures introduced by 
Spain’s current conservative government (Anteproyecto 2013), the system has shown a 
marked trend towards recentralization. However, the legal and economic restrictions 
placed on the Autonomous Communities’ exterior activity by the State, especially in the 
context of growing Catalan nationalism, appear to have boosted the importance of 
Barcelona in the projection of Catalan culture abroad and increased the city’s 
competition with Madrid.  
 All in all, despite the decentralization of competences for cultural policy in Spain, 
the State has shown a clearly centralist conception of the capital’s role in cultural policy 
(not unlike that manifest in France). Today, the bulk of funding from the Ministry of 
Culture targets major national cultural industries and events in Madrid (Cubeles 1993; 
Simon 2006). However, this is not to deny the capacity of Barcelona’s city council to 
build certain alliances, targeting a range of goals, with both the State and Catalan 
governments thus providing the city with a variety of opportunities to promote its 
cultural internationalization, such as the use of different sources of economic and 
logistical resources in the city area. Thus, the trans-scalar character of Barcelona and its 
pending status as the capital of Catalonia (Mascarell 2007), a “stateless nation”, have 
promoted different dynamics between the administrations. On this question, the Catalan 
Government’s Foreign Action Plan (2010-2015) points out:   
 
“The image that the Barcelona brand has, the role this plays in the 
city’s international projection and its potential for the image of Catalonia 
should be borne in mind here. Barcelona undoubtedly serves as a catalyst 
for many positive elements for Catalonia as a whole and which we must 
learn to associate with different but inseparable realities. As such, we 
must learn how to activate the great potential of the Barcelona brand and 
to use it in a way that it can complement the image of Catalonia” 
(Departament de Vicepresidència 2010). 
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This process of establishing a cultural projection from the conception of joint 
capital status in the context of a pluri-national State is comparable, to a degree, with the 
city of Montreal.  
Montreal is the economic and administrative capital of Quebec, Canada’s second 
largest province in terms of population, and capital of its francophone nation. Canada 
operates a federalist system of government that is considered respectful of its national 
and cultural diversity (Kymlicka 2003). The State’s ten provinces enjoy responsibility 
for education and culture (Art. 93 of the Constitution) and, unlike Spain, foreign policy 
is not clearly defined as the exclusive competence of the central State (Nossal et al. 
2007). As a result, Quebec, a province with a deeply rooted nationalist movement, has 
developed its own strong cultural paradiplomacy “as the extension of its internal 
cultural competences” (Gérin-Lajoie 1965) and as the representation of its singular 
identity (Bélanger 1994, p. 425). This policy has also been the subject of various 
processes of negotiation with the central government (Barba 2006, p. 135), and has been 
characterized by a similar international strategy to that adopted in Catalonia.  
Like Barcelona, Montreal was governed for many years by a charismatic mayor, 
Jean Drapeau (1954–1957, 1960–1986), who promoted major international events 
(including the 1976 Montreal Olympics), instigated an urban regeneration program and 
fostered a cosmopolitan imaginary for the city (Germain and Rose, 2000, Gérin-Lajoie 
1965, p. 579). From within his center-right party, Drapeau promoted a federal system 
for Canada and, in common with Maragall, supported the importance of the identity of 
Montreal, in this instance within francophone Canada, but he was opposed to any claims 
to sovereignty. Today, Montreal’s cultural paradiplomacy is promoted by the Council of 
the Arts, which fosters the work of local artists and which organizes an internationally 
renowned program of spectacles, including it cinema and jazz festivals (Conseil des arts 
de Montréal 2012). One of the current objectives of the city council is to make Montreal 
a “leading metropolis of the arts on both the national and international stages” (Conseil 
des arts de Montréal 2012, p. 41). Moreover, the city has been defined as an active 
center for promoting Quebec’s foreign cultural policies (Gouvernement du Québec  
2006, p.87). 
While the purpose of this study is not to make a detailed comparative analysis, a 
number of similarities between these two cities are worth stressing. In line with Lecours 
(2002) we should stress the importance of nationalism in accounting for regional 
paradiplomacy and for defining their identities, while the development of the two cities’ 
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external cultural policies needs to be seen in connection with the cultural competences 
enjoyed by other cities in their respective States.  
 
 
Barcelona’s cultural paradiplomacy: between “cultures” and branding 
A second dynamic force in the definition and projection of Catalan culture is associated 
with the political struggle between the respective authorities of the city of Barcelona 
(the city council’s cultural institutions) and the Generalitat, the government of the 
Autonomous Community (Moragas i Spà 2008). In this regard, Subirós (1993) stresses: 
 
“Although the activity of the Generalitat is complex and, in many 
sectors, oriented towards modernization and economic competiveness, the 
ideological discourse of Jordi Pujol and a good part of his political strategy 
is based on a historicist, essentialist, ruralist and anti-metropolitan script 
that looks for and uses confrontation with Barcelona and the central 
government to confirm and reinforce the autonomy and competences of the 
Generalitat” (Cited in McNeill 1999, p. 67). 
 
This political struggle has been typified by two dimensions. One of these was closely 
linked to the “search for attention” and attempts to internationalize the city via the 
projects developed during the 1980s. The other was linked to the “struggle to construct 
a perception” and was concerned with connecting the city’s image and culture to the 
representation of a particular identity. In this framework, the power of the Barcelona 
image and its internationalization has come into clear conflict with Catalan culture and 
its identity. Yet, in practice, this tension between the Generalitat and the city council 
evolved over two decades within the context of a common Catalan nationalist ideology 
(Catalanisme) held by the region’s two main political parties. Thus, in many instances, 
any controversy surrounding Barcelona’s cultural projection was not underpinned by 
any disagreement as to the constitutive nature of its cultural policy but rather concerned 
the instrumentalization of artistic events and activities with an international presence 
and the management of local public opinion. In a similar vein, Jordi Pujol, the former 
president of Catalonia, has explained why the Generalitat’s general commitment to the 
importance of the diffusion of Catalan culture in conjunction with Pasqual Maragall had 




“Maragall is a man of Catalan culture. But, at a given moment 
there were some differences, a certain distance between the Catalan 
culture being promoted from within the city council, by the Socialist 
Party and before that by the Communist Party, and us. There was some 
distance. But, at the end of the day, these differences were not important. 
They might arise at a given moment and might emerge as a problem of 
political leadership.” (Jordi Pujol, pers. comm., 9th Jan. 2013). 
 
Subsequent to these tensions, the current conception of the city’s cultural policy 
as held by the first Counselor of Culture to represent CiU, Jaume Ciurana, provides a 
new perception of Barcelona as the capital of Catalonia. In a conference held in October 
2011 he outlined ICUB’s new cultural policy. He argued that Barcelona should now: 
“exercise responsibly and uninhibitedly as the capital of Catalonia” (Ciurana 2011, p. 
1), because: “we have played at being capital of many things, some more justified than 
others, but we forget that what makes Barcelona different from other cities is that 
Barcelona is the capital of a nation with its own culture.” (Ciurana 2011, p. 2). Ciurana 
also warned of the risks of converting Barcelona into a ‘non-place’ by comparing the 
city with an airport waiting lounge. Likewise, he stressed: “Catalan culture does not 
have the power of a State behind it, but let it be known that the capital is prepared to put 
itself at the head” (Ciurana 2011, p. 3).  In reference to the relations between the city 
and Catalonia, he asserted: “In recent years, there has been, culturally speaking, a 
disconnection between the capital and the country” (Ciurana 2011, p. 5). Echoing the 
thoughts of Ramoneda (2011), he noted that, even though the internationalization of 
Barcelona is an achievement, it is based on branding and not on the city’s cultural 
heritage. To reverse this situation, the politician suggested, among other actions, linking 
the name of Barcelona with the “great names” of Catalan culture and taking measures to 
assimilate the city’s immigrants and not allowing multiculturalism to fail as it patently 
has in other European capitals (Ciurana 2011, p. 13).  
This process has recently seen the first steps being taken towards establishing a 
coalition in cultural paradiplomacy between the city and the autonomous community 
with the incorporation of Barcelona City Council on the board of the Ramon Llull 
Institute in 2014 (Ara Cultura 2014). In this new context of the same political party 
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holding office in the Generalitat and in the city council, new dialogues on 
“Catalanisme” will no doubt be entered into. 
  However, a second element emerging is the new model of international cultural 
policy, which is generating a certain rhetorical and programmatic tension between the 
city council’s projects that seek the economic promotion and branding of Barcelona, on 
the one hand, and ICUB’s exterior actions, on the other (pers. comm., Jordi Pascual, 
ICUB 31 Jan. 2013).  Here, a key independent variable is the prevailing relationship 
between public institutions and the local cultural arena and its actors in the creation and 
projection of a representation of the city. In this sense, Barcelona’s cultural 
paradiplomacy evolved from the establishment of a specific structure designed to 
promote the city’s internationalization, in the context of the Cultural Olympiad (1987) 
and based on the creation and restoration of the city’s cultural infrastructure – with 
assets that quickly proved to be politically and economically profitable, to a broader 
more complex policy during the nineties. This latter policy has shown a marked 
tendency to intensify the city’s cultural projection (ICUB-1996), through the promotion 
of large-scale events and the strengthening of the city’s institutional networking in 
parallel with the development of the city’s branding, directed by the public 
paradiplomacy and tourism sectors.  
 In this process new “recourses and constraints” (Logan et al. 1997) have shaped the 
internationalization policies, exacerbating local social and political tensions. Hence, the 
development, over more than two decades, of a major economic transformation linked 
to tourism and transnational investment that has fostered the reform of the city’s cultural 
policy and which today represents a clear challenge for the successful management of 




The present article has explored the origins and characteristics of the external cultural 
policies implemented by the city of Barcelona. In addition, it has examined the 
governmental and social dynamics in which this policy is embedded, within the broader 
context of the internationalization of the city’s image. In so doing, it has analyzed the 
general attributes of cities’ cultural paradiplomacies and the relations established with 
the goals and methods of branding.   
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The political backdrop against which cities’ cultural paradiplomacies have 
emerged has been characterized by a shift from a “nationally determined, locally 
relayed, welfare-oriented” policy to a “(supra-)nationally facilitated, locally determined, 
wide-ranging supply-side intervention” (Jessop 1997, p. 31). Indeed, the formation of 
multi-level governance and the diverse changes in state regulation and organization 
provide the background for this study.  
During the 1980s, Barcelona experienced a major overhaul of its economy and 
infrastructure as the city was rapidly converted into a service economy. These processes 
generated the conditions that were favorable for attracting transnational capital and for 
promoting the city’s cultural paradiplomacy, a key practice in this restructuring given 
the relevance acquired by culture in the contemporary world. After the 1992 Olympics, 
Barcelona’s cultural policy was implemented in a context of social legitimacy, a 
strategy for economic and social development. During the decade following the games, 
the entrepreneurial turn taken by cultural policy and its marked economic and systemic 
trends served to reinforce a range of different internationalization projects in this field. 
Likewise, the international dimension of the urban culture also emerged as an attractive 
sector for the accumulation of political and economic capital. 
The cultural paradiplomacy adopted by Catalonia has acquired a unique 
character because of its condition as a “stateless nation”. Thanks to the establishment of 
the State of Autonomies, uncoordinated channels for the projection of an external 
identity have been created in a process that is inseparable from the pluri-national 
character of the State. As such, Catalonia’s cultural policies have more often than not 
been partially subsumed to the promotion of a national identity (Villaroya 2009, 
Crameri 2008). Within this framework, a vital dimension for the institutionalization of 
cultural paradiplomacy in Barcelona has been the prevailing ethnic-national tension. 
Barcelona’s cultural policy was immersed in the debate that sought to define the city’s 
identity and embedded in multiple projects organized by different levels of government. 
In this context, the rich diversity of Barcelona’s cultural paradiplomacy has served to 
place it on the map of global cities. At the same time, however, it has also gradually 
become an instrument for the construction of a new State, because of the growing 
importance of the movement for independence and the ongoing multi-party project 
within the Catalan parliament to “consult” the nation about its future. Hence, unlike the 
cities in other nations engaged in paradiplomacy around the world, including its 
counterparts in Brazil, Argentina and the US, Barcelona is an active participant in a 
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dispute for the external representation and definition of its “national” character and this 
fact has served to boost its political actions and instrumentalizations.  
In this sense, while internationalism, as Carlton Hayes (1955) has pointed out, 
supposes the existence of nationalism, internationalization does not. Therefore, cities 
that export culture as heritage or as arts, as ways of life, as part of city-branding 
projects, these cities can also act in a “postpolitical” way (Aronczyk 2009). However, 
the image that derives from these strategies can be connected symbolically to other 
identities and be subjected strategically to diverse political and economic goals. In this 
last regard, we understand that the effects of the transnationalization of the economy 
and the expansion of cultural branding make the practical and the theoretical 
delimitation of cultural paradiplomacy problematic. Moreover, they also impact the 
local cultural policy agenda, generating tension between culture understood as a social 
service and public issue and cultural goods as an image for commercial goals. 
To sum up, both the outward appearance and the inherent characteristics of 
Barcelona’s cultural paradiplomacy have been linked to changes in the international 
system and in international cultural policy; yet, at the same time, it has acquired its own 
specific character due to a State process of administrative decentralization, the impact of 
movements strengthening local identities (Mascarell 2007) and the pluri-national 
character of the State. All these elements have contributed to the overhaul of traditional 
cultural diplomacy in a progressive system characterized by policies that include central 
and sub-state activities, at times working to complement each other; at times in 
opposition (Criekemans 2010, p. 39). And while this trend can, on the one hand, result 
in the “loss of decisional and operational autonomy by state apparatuses (at whatever 
level) it can also enhance their capacity to project state power” (Jessop 1997, p. 33), but 
as Jessop (1997) points out: these changes in government structure can, furthermore, 
generate problems of governance failure, characterized by limited co-ordination and 
conflicting goals, something that, from the perspective of traditional cultural diplomacy, 
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1 Specifically to the so-called “primacy of the executive” and the monopoly of state law in this area 
(Vilanova 1995). 
2 Catalonia operates seven government departments with the remit to undertake cultural paradiplomacy 
and runs seventy offices around the world. The latter include Government Delegations (not unlike 
embassies) and cultural entities such as the Ramon Llull Institute (IRL) with offices in Europe and the US 
and the Catalan Institute for Cultural Industries (ICEC) in Europe.   
3 This was most evident in the orientation given to this activity by pro-independence parties, above all 
during the government of the tripartite left-wing coalition in Catalonia (2003-2006), when this policy was 
managed by Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. Indeed, it might be argued that cultural paradiplomacy 
was occasionally employed as a “protodiplomatic tool” i.e. an instrument defined for use in the 
international environment to manage external public opinion and to persuade other political actors with 
the goal of achieving independence (Duchacek 1990). 
4 In Spain, local government (city and provincial authorities) have significant managerial power in local 
cultural policy, the administration of local heritage, libraries (any territory with more than 5,000 
inhabitants must be served by a library) and a range of artistic activities. 
5 It was ranked fourth among Europe’s most visited cities in 2010, with five million visitors (Euromonitor 
International 2012). 
6 The Socialist Party of Catalonia linked to the Spanish national socialist party (PSOE). This organization 
enjoyed a position of hegemony at the local level of government in Catalonia for several decades. The 
successive Barcelona governments played a central role in defining Catalan cultural policies and in the 
democratization of access to culture. 
7 Ulldemolins identifies this as the beginning of a new approach to cultural policies, an approach based on 
the articulation of private and public participation (Rius 2003).  
8 For example, he was highly active in various multilateral institutions. Barcelona provided the seat for 
the formal constitution of the Eurocities network in 1989 (Borja 1997, p. 15). In 1992, Maragall was 
elected President of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, where he played a tireless role, 
and, in 1996, he was elected President of the Committee of the Regions of the European Union. 
9 The City Council participated in the creation and support of the Barcelona Center for International 
Affairs (CIDOB), Aula Barcelona, Fundación Casa América Cataluña, Instituto Barcelona de Estudios 
Internacionales (IBEI), and Instituto Europeo del Mediterráneo (IEMed). 
10 For example, in 2006 it participated in almost forty projects and networks aimed at promoting 
international cultural cooperation, including YOUROPE - the European Festivals Association, and Escity 
- Europe, Science and the City (ICUB 2006). 
11 Barcelona also played host, from its foundation in 2004, to United Cities and Local Governments 
(CGLU) and is an active member of the UN’s Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA) and 
within various city networks and associations. 
12 Among others, Barcelona participates in the Eurocities – Culture Forum; Initiatives in Dance through 
European Exchange (IDEE); International Network for Contemporary Performing Arts (IETM); South 
European Association for Contemporary Creation (IRIS) and International Federation of Library 
Associations and Institutions (IFLA). 
13 These policies are strongly concentrated in Catalonia’s metropolitan areas as is made evident by the 
survey conducted by the Observatory of Local Government 2012 (Observatory 2012).  
14 In the case of Paris, the paradiplomacy of the city changed from complementing the Central State’s 
foreign action to active self-promotion after 2001 (Jouve 2007, p.378). Actions of cultural paradiplomacy 
are implemented by the Direction des Affaires Culturelles and the General Delegation for International 
Relations and the General Delegation of Events and Protocol of the city council (www.paris.fr). These 
bodies organize programs to promote Parisian artists and the city’s cultural institutions abroad and to 
foster cultural cooperation with other governments and diverse foreign actors. They also organize 
festivals with a clear international projection, such as the Nuit Blanche (copied by many cities), and are 
active in international networks (Ville Paris 2013, p.6). In Berlin, the Senate has promoted a range of 
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actions to support art organizations and events of international dimensions, including the Berlin Biennale, 
and through its international promotion of the city’s cultural industries, has even shown a tendency 
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Table 1.  Main activities in the cultural paradiplomacy of ICUB (2001-2010) 
Year Activity 
2001 Active member of Culture Committee of Eurocities 
2002 Gaudi International Year 2002 (joint project organized by the Autonomous and Central Governments)  
           2003 “Agenda 21” with Porto Alegre City Council 
 Exportation of MACBA exhibition and SONAR festival 
2004 European Film Awards of European Film Academy 
 Host of United Cities 
 Universal Forum of Cultures 
2005 Participation in Working Group “Agenda 21” United Cities and Local Governments 
  Presidency of Cultural Network of Eurocities 
 Final conference of Eurocult 21 Project 
 Year of Books and Reading at Book Fair in Guadalajara 
 Exhibition Gaudí. Geneva (History Museum of City and Central Government)   
2006 Working Group on Culture/United Cities and Local Governments 
 Consortium of libraries. Cooperation with libraries of Mediterranean region/ MEDACT 
2007 Committee on Culture - United Cities and Local Governments    
 Forum of Cultures /Eurocities 
 Barcelona & Modernity. Gaudí to Dalí, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York  
 Cosmos Gaudí (with the collaboration of the Central Government)  
2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 
2009 Committee on Culture - United Cities and Local Governments   
2010 Presidency renewal of Committee on Culture - United Cities and Local Governments 
Source: ICUB memòries, 2001-2010 
 
 
 
